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DOES THE TERM "BANK BROKER-DEALER"
STILL HAVE MEANING?
The Authors examine whether, in the aftermath of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, bank-affiliated broker-dealers still face different
regulator)' restrictions than securities firms that are not part of
banking organizations. The Authors conclude that, at least at this
stage in the implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
important regulatory distinctions remain between securities firms
that are part of banking organizations and those that are not.
ALAN E. SORCHER AND SATISH M. KINI*
During the twentieth century, the financial services
industry witnessed both the separation and rejoining of the
banking and securities businesses. The severing of the two
business lines occurred in the wake of the Great Depression when
Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933 (the relevant portions of
which are commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act); the
reunification of the businesses is the product of years of industry
efforts that culminated in the enactment of comprehensive
financial modernization legislation in 1999, in the form of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).
In the half century between the two Acts, the term "bank
broker-dealer" came into common use. That term was a label
used for broker-dealers registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that were permitted to be part of
banking organizations. As a result of the prohibitions of the
Glass-Steagall Act and other banking statutes, these broker-
dealers were allowed to conduct only limited securities activities
and, thus, were distinguished from securities firms that were not
affiliated with banks. Although the special restrictions placed on
bank broker-dealers lessened over the years as industry
participants (backed by banking regulators) pushed the limits of
"Mr. Sorcher is vice president and associate general counsel for the Securities
Industry Association, and Mr. Kini is a partner vith Wilmer, Cutler & Pic!ering, in
Washington., DC.
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the Glass-Steagall Act, many significant limitations on bank
broker-dealers remained in place until the enactment of GLBA.
GLBA was thought to be the death knell of the term bank
broker-dealer because the law repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and
paved the way for the establishment of a so-called "two-way
street" in the financial services industry. That "two-way street"
was designed to enable securities firms and banks to affiliate freely
with each other and to ensure that securities firms, once they
became partners with banks, were not restricted in their activities
simply because of their bank affiliation.
In this Article, we examine whether GLBA has achieved its
legislative aims or whether broker-dealers that are part of banking
organizations continue to face more and different regulatory
restrictions than their brethren that lack bank affiliation. In Part I
of this Article, we first provide background on the separation and
gradual reunification of banking and securities.' In Part II, we
review the key parts of GLBA that established a framework for
affiliations between banks and securities firms.' In Part III, we
review the GLBA implementation process and assess the rules
issued by the regulatory agencies and the affect on securities
firms.3 We conclude that, as a result of regulatory interpretations
of the Act, a true "two-way street" between the banking and
securities businesses has not yet been achieved. For this reason,
we find that the term bank broker-dealer still has relevance in the
post-GLBA world.
I. SECURITIES ACTIVITIES AND BANKING-A SLOW EVOLUTION
From 1933 until the enactment of GLBA in 1999, banking
organizations were restricted-albeit to lesser and lesser degrees
over time-from participating fully in the securities business. The
restrictions on and limitations to the affiliation of banks and full-
service broker-dealers were found in portions of the Banking Act
1. See notes 4-60 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 61-93 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 94-152 and accompanying text.
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of 1933, informally kmown as the Glass-Steagall Act and
reinforced by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA).5
The process by which banking organizations gained access
to the securities business and securities firms were permitted to
affiliate with banks was long and arduous. Only as a result of
more than two decades of persistent efforts by industry
participants, first in the regulatory arena and then courts, were
banks and their broker-dealer affiliates allowed to offer various
securities services to their customers.
The changes rendered over those many years were
essentially endorsed and codified by GLBA, which formally
repealed the statutory barriers that long restricted the activities of
bank broker-dealers. In return for the repeal of the affiliation
restrictions, GLBA also eliminated the statutory exemption that
banks enjoyed from the securities regulatory scheme.
A. The Pre-Existing Statutory Framework
The Glass-Steagall Act was born of the Great Depression.
As a consequence of highly publicized hearings conducted in 1933
that documented various abuses involving large commercial banks
and their securities affiliates, Congress believed that banks and
their securities affiliates were substantially responsible for the
collapse of the American economy in the late-1920s and early-
1930s. 6 Today, economists offer competing theories on the cause
of the Depression, but few, if any, believe that the combination or
intermingling of banking and securities activities were the cause of
this catastrophic economic failure.7 Many economists also dispute
4. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 33-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
5. Banking Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 184149 (20030).
6. See ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD B.),NKs Do? 27 (1937) (citing Stock
Exchange Practices: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banl:ing
and Currency on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 239, 72nd Cong. (1933)); see also Carter H.
Golembe, History Disputes Tales of Pre-1933 Securities Irregularities by Banks,
BANKING POI'Y REP., Apr. 3, 1995 (describing the alleged misdeeds of banldng firms
and their securities affiliates and the critical re-examination of those allegations by
economic historians).
7. See Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Banking from Securities
and Commerce in the Modern financial Marketplace, 33 ARmz. L. REv. 583, 5S5-S6
(1991); Laura J. Cox, Note, The Impact of the Citicorp-Travelers Group Merger on
2002]
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the contention, which undergirded the Glass-Steagall framework,
that securities activities are inherently riskier than traditional
banking activities.8 Indeed, today, some commentators have gone
so far as to argue that the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted "on the
basis of inaccurate information, and... swept into law in an
atmosphere of near hysteria .... 9
The Glass-Steagall Act consisted of four statutory
sections-sections 16, 20, 21, and 32-each of which is designed to
operate in a different fashion to divorce the banking and securities
businesses. Sections 16 and 21 deal with the direct combination of
the securities and bank businesses; sections 20 and 32 dealt with
the indirect combination of the two business lines. Sections 20 and
32 were repealed in 1999 by GLBA.'I
Section 16 generally prohibits national banks and state-
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System
(state-member banks) from underwriting and dealing in securities,
except for certain federal, state, and local government bonds.
Section 16 also generally prohibits national banks and state-
member banks from purchasing and holding securities as principal,
except for certain exempted securities, which largely consist of
government bonds."
Section 21 is essentially the flip side to section 16; it
approaches the separation of banking and securities from the
securities side. 2 Under this section, any company engaged in
underwriting or dealing in securities-other than government
Financial Modernization and the Repeal of Glass-Steagall, 23 NOVA LAW REV. 899,
901-05 (1999).
8. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 50 (2001) (citing GEORGE W. BENSTON, THE
SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING 32 (1990)); Helen A.
Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a
Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501,512-13 (1989).
9. Carter H. Golembe, The Simple Message to Congress: Just Repeal Glass-
Steagall, BANKING POL'Y REP., Dec. 4, 1995; accord Golembe, supra note 6.
10. See infra notes 67 and accompanying text.
11. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (2000). By its terms, section 16 applies only to
national banks. State banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are
subject to the same restrictions by 12 U.S.C. § 335 (2000), which provides that "[s]tate
member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to
the purchasing, selling, underwriting, and holding of investment securities and stock
as are applicable in the case of national banks under [Section 16]." 12 U.S.C. § 335.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 377, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-
102, Title I, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 134 (Nov. 12, 1999).
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bonds in which banks may underwrite and deal under section 16-
is barred from accepting deposits."'
Section 20 generally prohibited national banks and state-
member banks from being "affiliated" with any company
"engaged principally" in underwriting and dealing in securities. 4
Thus, this section prevented a bank from owvning, or being under
common ownership with, a securities firm engaged principally in
securities underwriting and dealing activities.' Finally, section 32
prevented personnel interlocks between banks and entities
"primarily engaged" in the issuance, underwriting, public sale or
distribution of securities.
16
The restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act were
"strengthen[ed]" by the BHCA."7 Any company that controls a
bank organized in the United States is a bank holding company
that must register as such with the Federal Reserve and is subject
to the restrictions and limitations of the BHCA. This statute was
enacted by Congress in 1956 and expanded in scope in 1970 at the
urging of the Federal Reserve,' and it was conceived of principally
as an anti-monopoly measure. 19
Until recently, when it was materially amended by GLBA,
the BHCA generally restricted bank holding companies from
owning or controlling organizations that were not banks.-' There
were, however, a number of exceptions to this general
proscription; the most important exception existed in section
13. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2000).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 377, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-
102, Title I, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 134 (Nov. 12, 1999).
15. "Affiliate" is defined to include subsidiaries, parent companies, sister
companies that have the same parent, and companies having interlocking directors
(in each case involving majority of stock or directors). See ROBERT L. TORTORIELLO,
GUIDE TO BANK UNDERWRITING, DEALING AND BROKERAGE ACTIVITIES 1-5(4th ed.
2000).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 78, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L 89-695,
Title II, § 101(b), 113 Stat. 134 (Nov. 12, 1999).
17. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 72
(1981).
18. This statute was enacted to cover holding companies owning only a single
bank.
19. See PAULINE B. HELLER & MELANIE L. FEIN, FEDERAL HOLDING COmPANY
LAW § 17.01[11] (2001).
20. See Note, The Demise of the BanklNonbank Distinction: An Argument for
Deregulating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REv. 650, 652
(1985) ("a bank holding company faces a sharp limitation on permissible activities").
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4(c)(8) of the BHCA, which permitted bank holding companies to
invest in and control any company the activities of which the
Federal Reserve determined "to be so closely related to banking
[or managing or controlling banks] as to be a proper incident
thereto."'" It was through interpretation of section 4(c)(8) of the
BHCA and (section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act) that the Federal
Reserve permitted bank holding companies to engage in securities
2activities.
Another important aspect of federal banking law was the
complete exemption that banks enjoyed from the regulatory
scheme under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) that applied to securities broker-dealers.23  The bank
exemption, which did not apply to the affiliates of banks and bank
holding companies (but only to banks), began to increase in
importance as banks themselves began to engage in additional
retail and institutional securities brokerage and private placement
activities.24
B. Regulatory Reform
The rules separating the banking and securities industries
were largely unchallenged from the 1930s until the 1970s. During
this time, banks were quite content to operate within the confines
of the Glass-Steagall Act. After all, banking was a highly
regulated and protected industry that was able to operate very
profitably; there was a tremendous influx into the banking system
of relatively cheap deposits and a ready market of low-risk,
marketable assets (such as traditional bank loans) in which those
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000); accord Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of
Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481,489-90 (1988).
22. HELLER & FEIN, supra note 19, § 4.01 (detailing the political and industry
pressures that led the Federal Reserve from its initially restrictive posture regarding
the activities permissible under section 4(c)(8) to taking a far more expansive
approach).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2000) (definition of broker); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)
(definition of dealer).
24. See, e.g., Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings
Associations, and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,760, 27,761 (May 18, 2001) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200 and 240); see infra notes 25-46 and accompanying text (discussing
the process by which banking firms began to engage in securities activities either
directly or through bank broker-dealers).
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cheap deposits could be invested. For several decades, banks
earned a good and relatively risk-free living off the spread
between those deposits and assets?
That began to change gradually commencing in the 1950s;
by the 1970s, banks were facing significant pressures on both sides
of their balance sheet from non-bank purveyors of financial
services. On the liability side of the balance sheet, depositors
switched from demand deposits to interest-bearing time deposits,
increasing the costs of deposits to banks. In addition, sophisticated
corporate and individual savers began to move money entirely out
of the banking system and into non-banking financial instruments,
such as money market funds."
On the asset half of the balance sheet, banks lost their
traditional base of corporate borrowers. Many commercial firms,
particularly the most creditworthy of them, found that they could
borrow more cheaply by issuing short-term debt. This trend not
only deprived banks of part of their stable customer base, but also
forced banks to compete more vigorously for the right to lend to
riskier borrowers, which lacked access to the commercial paper
market.27
At the same time that the banking business became less
profitable and more volatile the securities business was undergoing
significant change. For instance, the advent of computerized
portfolio strategies, new derivatives, and hedging techniques made
securities underwriting risks more manageable and, in certain
respects, less risky than the commercial lending business." The
Glass-Steagall Act and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the BHCA,
however, prevented banking firms from acquiring broker-dealer
affiliates and gaining access to the securities business. The very
statutes that originally served to protect and insulate banks now
acted like straitjackets and caged them in.
Bandng regulators were concerned with the changes
occurring in the banking industry. By the 1980s, faced with
declines in bank asset quality and profitability, the regulators
25. See Garten, supra note 8, at 514-19.
26. See id. at 522. This disintermediation wvas caused both by technological
innovations that allowed funds to be moved quickly and inexpensively in and out of
bank and non-bank financial instruments, and by the inability of banks to pay market
rates of interest on their deposits because of regulatory ceiling5. See Ad.
27. Id at 523-34.
28. See MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BAN,%KS § 1.03, at 0-7 (213-9).
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began to be increasingly receptive to attempts by banks to
diversify and to enter the securities business. Regulators were
forced to adopt innovative positions because Congress was
gridlocked over the issue of financial services reform and various
attempts at legislative change met with failure.29  Through
innovative interpretations of the existing statutory scheme,
regulators began to permit banking firms to engage in an ever-
broader array of securities activities despite the Glass-Steagall Act
and BHCA.30
1. Brokerage and Riskless Principal Activities
In the early 1980s, the Federal Reserve (which, as noted
above, regulates bank holding companies) and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (which regulates national
banks) interpreted section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act to permit
bank holding companies and national banks, respectively, to
acquire securities affiliates and to engage in discount brokerage
activities.3' The authority was expanded later in the 1980s and
early 1990s to allow banks and bank affiliates to offer full-service
brokerage32 and riskless principal services.33
29. See, e.g., Golembe, supra note 6; Garten, supra note 8, at 503 n.7 (noting that
Congress "repeatedly has considered but failed to enact legislation repealing the
Glass-Steagall Act's fifty-year-old ban on bank securities activities"). That legislative
gridlock broke in 1999, with the passage of GLBA. See infra notes 61-93 and
accompanying text.
30. See FEIN, supra note 28, §1.03, at 7-8.
31. See In re Security Pacific National Bank, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,284, at 86,255 (Aug. 26, 1982); OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 363, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,533 at 77,828
(May 23, 1986); BankAmerica Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 105 (1983) (order approving
application to engage in combined investment advisory and securities execution
services). A discount broker buys and sells securities for its customers as agent and
does not provide any recommendations or investment advice. Accordingly,
commissions charged by discount brokers are typically lower than those charged by
"full-service" brokers. See, e.g., FEIN, supra note 28, § 6.02[A], at 6-5.
32. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 386, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,610, at 77,932 (June 1, 1987); National Westminster
Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1986) (order approving application to engage in
combined investment advisory and securities execution services); 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.25(b) (1991).
33. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 375, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,545, at 77,853 (Sept. 25, 1986); Bankers Trust New York
Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 829 (1989) (order approving application to act as agent in
[Vol. 6234
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2. Securities Underwriting and Dealing
By the late 1980s, the Federal Reserve interpreted section
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act and section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA to
permit bank holding companies to engage through broker-dealer
affiliates in underwriting and dealing, first, in commercial paper
and certain other debt securities and, later, in corporate debt and
equity securities to a "limited extent" and subject to various
prudential restrictions and firewalls.? The Federal Reserve
allowed bank holding companies to engage in this activity because,
in its view, section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act only restricted
bank affiliates from being "engaged principally" in undenvriting
and dealing activities. The Federal Reserve took the position that
an affiliate would not be "engaged principally" in securities
underwriting and dealing so long as its underwriting and dealing
revenues were a limited percent of the affiliates total gross
revenues.
35
the private placement of all types of securities and to act as riskless principal in
buying and selling securities).
34. Initially, the Federal Reserve approved underwriting and dealing in four
types of securities: commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed
securities, and consumer-receivable securities. See Citicorp et al., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
473 (1987) (order approving applications to engage in limited underwriting and
dealing in certain securities). In 19S9, the Federal Reserve approved underiting
and dealing in corporate debt securities. See J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. et al., 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. 192 (19S9) (order conditionally approving applications to engage, to a
limited extent, in underwriting and dealing in securities). Subsequently, the Federal
Reserve approved equity securities underwriting and dealing activities. See Chase
Manhattan Corp., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1994) (order approving an application to
engage in underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible securities on a limited basis).
The Federal Reserve did not, however, approve the underwriting of ope.n-end
investment companies, i.e, mutual funds. Accordingly, bank affiliates could not act as
mutual fund distributors. See, e.g., FEIN, supra note 28. § 9.03[B], at 9-26.
35. See Citicorp et al., supra note 34. The other parts of gross revenue could
consist of revenue from other securities activities, including, for esample, brokerage
activities. Id. The Federal Reserve also applied a market share test in determining
whether a section 20 affiliate was "engaged principally" in securities under-riting
and dealing: under that test, an affiliate could not underwrite more than five percent
of the total amount of a type of security. That test did not v.ithstand judicial scrutiny.
See, e.g., id.; Sec. Indus. Assoc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve S s., 839 F.2d
47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). The Federal Reserve also took the
position that securities underwriting and dealing activities %, ere permissible under
section 4(c)(S) of the BHCA. See FEIN, supra note 28, § 4.03[B], at 9-13. Revenue
limits are only applied to "bank ineligible" securities. Sec. Indus. Assoc., v. Bd. of
Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1938).
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Initially, the Federal Reserve limited a section 20 affiliate's
total securities underwriting and dealing revenues to merely five
percent of the company's gross revenues.36 That sum was first
raised to ten percent.37 In 1996, the Federal Reserve increased the
revenue limit to twenty-five percent.38
A banking firm wishing either to acquire a securities firm
engaged in securities underwriting and dealing activities or to form
a de novo section 20 affiliate had to file an extensive application
with the Federal Reserve, had to subject the securities affiliate to
examination and review by the Federal Reserve, and had to agree
to comply with dozens of so-called "firewalls" on section 20
companies.39 These firewalls were meant to separate firmly the
section 20 underwriting and dealing affiliate from its sister bank.
The firewalls addressed concerns of safety and soundness, conflicts
of interest and other perceived risks to banks (and the federal
deposit insurance fund) from their affiliates' securities activities."
The firewalls were by all accounts a heavy price to pay for
bank broker-dealers engaging in securities underwriting and
dealing; the firewalls imposed numerous inefficiencies and raised
the costs for section 20 affiliates. These costs and inefficiencies
were not borne by securities firms that were not affiliated with
banks; accordingly, bank broker-dealers that were section 20
companies were hindered from competing effectively and on a
level playing field with their non-bank-affiliated competitors. 4'
As the Federal Reserve became more familiar with section
20 companies and their securities businesses, it began to relax the
36. See Citicorp et al., supra note 34, at 476.
37. Section 20 affiliates had to file regular financial statements with the Federal
Reserve demonstrating their compliance with the gross revenue limit. The limit was
calculated on a two-year rolling basis; that is, the revenue from securities
underwriting and dealing for each quarter, when added to the gross revenue from
such activities for the previous seven fiscal quarters, could not exceed the Federal
Reserve's revenue threshold when compared with the total revenues of the section 20
affiliate for that same eight quarter period. See FEIN, supra note 28, § 9.03[B], at 9-19
to 9-24.
38. See id. at 9-20; Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of
Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities,
61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Dec. 30, 1996).
39. See TORTORIELLO, supra note 15, at 111-2 to III-11.
40. See J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. et al., supra note 34.




firewall restrictions. Eventually, the Federal Reserve narrowed
the firewalls-of which there were more than twenty-to eight
manageable operating standards4 2 The operating standards
permitted bank-affiliated securities firms to engage in
underwriting and dealing under a framework that was closer to
that of (but still not identical to) other securities industry
competitors.4"
3. Merchant Banking
Regulatory reform, however successful, did not break down
one of the more important limitations on bank-affiliated firms-
the ability to engage in merchant banking activities. Merchant
banking is the activity of taking an equity position in a so-called
"portfolio company" (typically a non-public company) as an
investment.' The equity position is usually taken with an eye to
its sale at a profit when the portfolio company has grown and
perhaps is ready to go public.
Banking firms were able to engage only in limited
merchant banking activities under the Glass-Steagall Act and
BHCA. Banks themselves could generally only invest in certain
debt securities and were prohibited from taking equity stakes in
companies.45 Bank holding companies were able to do more, but
also were limited in the investment stakes that they could take in
non-financial companies. In general, bank holding companies
could not acquire more than five percent of the voting stock of any
portfolio company.46 Despite urgings and reform proposals
42. 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(1)-(S) (2001).
43. The OCC subsequently permitted special subsidiaries of national banks-so
called "operating subsidiaries"-also to underwrite and deal in securities. The OCC
largely followed the Federal Reserve's section 20 framework. See, e.g., OCC
Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec. 11, 1997) (permitting a national bank to
under-write and deal in municipal revenue bonds to a limited extent).
44. TORTORIELLO, supra note 15, at 14; BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 8,
at 75S.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (2000) (-nothing herein contained shall authorize the
purchase by [a national bank] for its own account of any shares of stock of any
corporation").
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (2000). Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA generally limited
bank holding companies from acquiring more than five percent of the voting shares
of any portfolio company. Id. As noted above, however, bank holding companies
could acquire control of those companies engaged exclusively in activities deemed
2002] 237
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
advanced by the banking industry, the Federal Reserve did not
agree to raise this five percent limit, which it determined to be
statutorily mandated.
C. Court Decisions
Many of the key regulatory agency decisions that expanded
the power of banks and bank holding companies to acquire
securities firms and to engage in securities brokerage, riskless
principal, and underwriting and dealing activities were challenged
by the securities industry, which alleged that the regulatory
decisions contravened the prohibitions and restrictions of the
Glass-Steagall Act.47 The federal courts eventually upheld the key
banking agency interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act.
The first major judicial case, however, represented a loss
for the banking industry. In the 1971 case of Investment Company
Institute v. Camp,48 which scholars regard as the "high water mark
of the Glass-Steagall Act," the Supreme Court held that a bank-
sponsored investment vehicle was a security.49 As such, the Court
found that a bank could not operate the investment vehicle under
the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act.5 0
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion based on its
analysis of the "subtle hazards" that it concluded the Glass-
Steagall Act was intended to proscribe." According to the Court,
there were many subtle hazards that Congress in 1933 feared,
including, for example:
"closely related to banking" with Federal Reserve approval. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text.
47. To some extent, the problem also was one of reciprocity-many in the
securities industry felt that the regulatory decisions that paved the way for increasing
participation of banking organizations in the securities business did not permit
securities firms also to conduct banking activities. For instance, securities firms (and
others) were thwarted by Congress in their ability to establish "nonbank" banks-
banks that either accepted deposits or made commercial loans and thereby averted
the restrictions of the BHCA. The courts had permitted such nonbank banks to be
formed, for example, see Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension
Finan. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1985), but Congress overturned the courts' decisions in
the Competitive Equality of Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA), Pub. L. 100-86, 101
Stat. 554 (1987).
48. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
49. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 8, at 735.
50. Camp, 401 U.S. at 635.
51. Id. at 630.
238 [Vol. 6
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that the promotional needs of investment banking
might lead commercial banks to lend their
reputation for prudence and restraint to the
enterprise of selling particular stocks and securities,
and that this could not be done without that
reputation being undercut by the risks necessarily
incident to the investment banking business. There
was also perceived the danger that when
commercial banks were subject to the promotional
demands of investment banking, they might be
tempted to make loans to customers with the
expectation that the loan would facilitate the
purchase of stocks and securities. There was
evidence before Congress that loans for investment
written by commercial banks had done much to feed
the speculative fever of the late 1920's.52
Camp and its expansive "subtle hazards" reading of the Glass-
Steagall Act has subsequently been highly criticized." Scholars
have argued that the decision was overly broad and went far
beyond what was necessary for the Court to reach its decision in
Camp. 54
Subsequent court decisions focused less on the broad
"subtle hazards" approach and more on the plain meaning of the
relevant statutory proscriptions." Later courts also proved more
willing than the Court in Camp to defer to the bank regulatory
52. Id. at 632.
53. See FEIN, supra note 28, §4.04[B], at 4-30.
54. See James R. Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The
Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle Hazards" in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON4 L.
REv. 21, 42 (1995): see also Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards. Financial Risks, and
Diversified Banks. An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform. 49 MD. L. REv. 314,
326 (1990) (noting that, "[als an accurate statement of the real motives behind the
Glass-Steagall Act, the Camp subtle hazards are somewhat suspect"). Others have
contended that, although Camp represented an immediate setback for the banking
industry and its attempt to secure greater securities powers for banks and their
affiliates, the case laid the seedbed for subsequent agency and court interpretations
that favored the banking industry. According to this view, although Camp did not
uphold the OCC's position in that case, the Court did note the need to defer to give
substantial weight to agency interpretations. See Regulatory, Reform in Transition:
The Dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 545,553-54 (1995).
55. See FEIN, supra note 28, § 4.04[A], at 4-27 to 4-29.
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agencies' interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act and BHCA, in
part as a result of the Supreme Court's intervening decision on the
standard of administrative review in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
5 6
A landmark case that followed this approach of strictly
reading the statutory language and deferring to agency
interpretation was Securities Industry Association v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,57 in which the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Federal Reserve's
reading of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act to permit bank
holding company affiliates to engage in securities underwriting and
dealing to a limited extent. In reaching this decision, the court
carefully tracked the "engaged principally" language in section 20
of the Glass-Steagall Act and concluded that this wording was not
intended to "sever completely the commercial and investment
banking industries."5 8  Instead, the court believed that the
language evidenced a decision by Congress to tolerate at least
some securities underwriting and dealing activities in bank
affiliates so long as those securities activities were not the chief
activities of those affiliates. 9 The court concluded that the Act's
"key phrase" was "intrinsically ambiguous" and chose to uphold
the Federal Reserve's reading of the "engaged principally"
language as reasonable.60
56. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that, in judging an agency's construction of a statute, a court
must undertake a two-step inquiry. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). First, it must ask if
Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue. Id. If it has, and the intent of
Congress is clear, then the inquiry there ends. Id. at 842-43. If Congress has not so
spoken, then the question is whether the agency's interpretation is rational and
"based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. If it is, the court
must uphold the agency's interpretation and not substitute the court's own view for
that of the agency. Id. The breadth and scope of Chevron's reach has been the
subject of more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
57. 839 F.2d 47, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
58. Id. at 58
59. Id. at 58-60.
60. Id. at 63.
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I. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY AcT--ONE CAUTIOUS
STEP FORWARD
While the regulatory and litigation process gradually
reshaped the relationship between securities firms and banks,
dozens of legislative attempts were made to repeal formally the
Glass-Steagall Act and end that Act's separation of the banking
and securities industries.6  In fact, Senator Glass himself-for
whom the original act was named-initiated the first of these
attempts merely one year after the Act's enactment.62
These legislative reform efforts repeatedly failed because it
was impossible to achieve consensus among: (a) the banking,
securities, and insurance industries, which were the three
industries most affected by reform legislation; (b) interested
regulatory agencies (chiefly the Treasury Department, the OCC,
and the Federal Reserve) as to which would play a lead role in
regulating an integrated financial services industry that was no
longer artificially Balkanized; and (c) between the congressional
committees that oversee the banking and securities industries as to
which would have principal draftsmanship over reform legislation
and jurisdiction over the unified financial services industry once
legislation was enacted.63
The drama, intrigue and, ultimately, disappointments that
characterized the legislative efforts at repealing the Glass-Steagall
Act came to a resounding conclusion on November 12, 1999, when
President Clinton signed into law GLBA -- arguably the most
important federal banking legislation in over 65 years.rs To be
6L See, e.g., Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings
Associations, and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,66 Fed. Reg. 27,760,27,761 n.7 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200 and 240) (SEC chronicle of recent reform bills); Edv:ard D. Sullivan, Glass-
Steagall Update: Proposals to Modernize the Structure of the Financial Services
Industy, 112 BANKING L. J. 977, 984-92 (1995) (detailing various then-evxiting
proposals to repeal Glass-Steagall and reform the financial services industry).
62. See BRoomE & MARmHAM, supra note 8, at 754.
63. See FEIN, supra note 28, § 1.06, at 1-2" to 1-33.
64. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 10b-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
65. Whether GLBA should be regarded as truly landmark legislation or merely a
codification of prior regulatory positions is a subject of much debate. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramn-Lcach-Blile.
25 J. CoRP. L. 691, 691-92 (2000); Satish M. Kini, Gramn-Leach-Bliley's Bumpy Start
Doesn't Jusdt., Thinking It a Failure, AM. BANI4ER, Apr. 27, 2001, at 13; Alan E.
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sure, this was vital (and much overdue) legislation, which finally
brought the regulatory structure for the American financial
services industry out of the Depression Era and into the 21st
century. But the legislation was not truly revolutionary. For
instance, GLBA essentially codified the bank regulatory agencies'
prior interpretations and built on the existing bank holding
company framework. Similarly, while GLBA removed the
artificial barriers that separated banking from securities (and
insurance), the Act largely left in place lines between banking and
"commercial" (i.e., non-financial) activities.66
The very first provision of GLBA strikes formally the two
sections of the Glass-Steagall Act-sections 20 and 32-that dealt
with the securities activities of bank-affiliated broker-dealers.67
GLBA, however, left alone sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-
Steagall Act, which, as noted above, principally deal with the direct
securities activities of banks.68
GLBA was designed to permit banks, securities firms and
insurance companies to affiliate freely, and the Act provided two
Sorcher, Deregulation: One Year and Counting, INVESTMENT NEws, Dec. 11, 2000,
at 12.
66. When the Act was being considered by Congress, Federal Reserve Chairman
Greenspan, among others, argued vociferously that, while financial modernization
was much needed, such modernization should not move beyond permitting
affiliations among financial service providers to allow the full integration of banking
and commercial enterprises. The Federal Reserve's First Monetary Policy Report to
Congress for 1999 (Humphrey-Hawkins): Need for Financial Modernization, Before
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (Feb. 23, 1999)
(testimony of Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Chairman), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1999 (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). This
full integration, Chairman Greenspan contended, should be reserved for the future-
once Congress and the regulators had had an opportunity to study and understand
how the underlying federal government subsidies of deposit insurance, discount
window access, and guaranteed final settlement through Fedwire could be folded into
a commercial firm. Id.
For a proposal on how to allow the full integration of banking and commerce,
see Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets
Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REv. 195,247-48 (2000).
67. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 101. Although section 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act was repealed, this did not mean that banking firms wishing to engage in
full-scope securities underwriting and dealing activities (beyond the confines of the
Federal Reserve's section 20 regulatory decisions) could automatically do so.
Instead, interested banks and bank holding companies first had to meet certain
qualifications to be able to take advantage of the statutory change. See, e.g.,
TORTORIELLO, supra note 15, at 6; infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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alternative frameworks for such affiliations. The Act also contains
important provisions eliminating the long-standing exclusions that
banks had enjoyed from most securities broker-dealer registration
requirements.69
A. Structural Alternatives for Affiliations Between Banks and
Securities Firms
GLBA provides two structural alternatives that banks and
securities firms may use to affiliate with each other and to engage
in a full range of securities activities. Under option one, a bank
holding company may elect to become a "financial holding
company" and engage in expanded financial activities through an
affiliate of the holding company." Under the second option, a
national bank may form a "financial subsidiary" and engage in
many, but not all, of the same securities activities through this
separately incorporated subsidiary of the bank.7
1. The Financial Holding Company Approach
GLBA amended the BHCA by adding to it several new
subsections that together establish the procedures and structure
for affiliations between banks and securities firms, as well as
insurance companies and other financial service purveyors. To
begin with, new section 4(k) of the BHCA generally permits bank
holding companies and foreign banks that meet certain
qualification requirements to become financial holding companies
and to engage broadly in any activity that is (a) "financial in
69. GLBA also contains numerous other provisions, including those that
established the Federal Reserve's primacy as "umbrella" supervisor of financial firms
and establishing privacy safeguards that govern how banks, securities firms, and other
financial institutions may handle and share confidential consumer information. For a
description of some of the GLBA's key provisions, see TORTORIELLO, supra note 15,
at 1-54; Russell J. Bruemmer & Satish M. Kini, Regulatory Implementation of
Financial Modernisation in the United States: Issues and Challenges, GLOB 't.
BANKING & FIN. PoL'y RE%,. 2001/2002 211 (on file vth author); Nina Hval,
Financial Modernization in the United States: What New Financial Activities U.S.
Banks and Foreign Banks in the United States Can Now Pursue, 34 INT'L Lw 1133
(2000); Alan E. Sorcher, Granum-Leach-Bliley Review: Has the Promise of Less
Regulation Led to More Rules, 2 . Lv. COMPLIANCE 7 2001).
70. See infra notes 72-SO and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 81-S6 and accompanying text.
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nature," (b) "incidental" to such financial activity, or (c)
"complementary" to such financial activity.72
Among the activities expressly permitted for financial
holding companies as "financial in nature" or "incidental" are a
number of securities activities, including securities brokerage,
securities underwriting, dealing, and market making (without the
section 20 revenue limitations), acting as underwriter for mutual
funds, and merchant banking.73 These activities are permitted
under GLBA without reference to the regulatory restrictions
previously imposed on them by the Federal Reserve's pre-GLBA
regulatory framework.74 In addition, financial holding companies
generally may engage de novo in these activities or acquire
securities firms engaged in these activities without prior notice to
the Federal Reserve,75 which was not the case for bank holding
companies under the pre-GLBA structure.76
New section 4() of the BHCA generally provides the
standards that bank holding companies must meet and maintain to
qualify for financial holding company status. These requirements
include meeting certain minimum capital and management
standards, as well as requirements under the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), for insured depository institution
subsidiaries of bank holding companies.77 New section 4(m)
includes provisions specifying how the Federal Reserve may
regulate financial holding companies that fail to maintain the
standards set forth under section 4().78
Securities firms seeking to acquire a bank and qualify as a
financial holding company must still apply to the Federal Reserve
to become a bank holding company under section 3 of the
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2000).
73. See id. § 1843(k)(4).
74. See, e.g., TORTORIELLO, supra note 15, at 13.
75. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2000) (noting the requirements for post-
commencement notice, in certain situations).
76. See PAULINE B. HELLER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW
§ 7.03 (American Lawyer Media 1994) (detailing the various types of notice and
application requirements that applied under the BHCA).
77. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l) (2000); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81,225.82 (2001).
78. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.83, 225.84; see also In re Dexia,
S.A., Nos. 01-14-CMP-FB-1,-2,-3 (Jan. 9, 2002) (order of civil money penalty against
banking firm for falling out of the standards required to be maintained by financial
holding companies), available at http://www.Federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
enforcement/2002/20020114/attachment.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
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BHCA 9 Such an application needs to be accompanied with
detailed financial information, is open for public comment, and
likely would be approved only after several months of processing."
2. Financial Subsidiary of a National Bank
Under GLBA, banks and securities firms have an
alternative approach to engage in expanded financial activities:
banks are permitted to form "financial subsidiaries" and-subject
to certain exclusions-may engage through these subsidiaries in
the same financial activities in which an affiliate of a financial
holding company may engage, including: (a) securities brokerage;
(b) securities underwriting, dealing, and market making without
any revenue limitations; and (c) mutual fund undernvriting." The
key activities specifically excluded for a financial subsidiary are:
insurance underwiting; insurance investments; real estate
investments; and merchant banking (for at least five years from the
enactment of the GLBA). 5
2
Like financial holding companies, national banks seeking to
engage in expanded activities through financial subsidiaries must
meet and maintain certain qualification standards. In particular, a
national bank and each depository institution affiliate of the
national bank must meet capital and management qualifications
and must have satisfactory CRA records." Various adverse
consequences-akin to those applicable to financial holding
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (2000).
SO. See, e.g., The Charles Schwab Corp., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 233 (2001) (order
approving acquisition and merger of Bank Holding Companies 1.
81. The authority for national banks is found at 12 U.S.C. § 24a (2000); 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.39 (2001). State banks also may establish similar subsidiaries subject to many of
the conditions that are applicable to national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1831w (2000);
12 C.F.R. § 208.7 (2001).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 5.39(f). Financial subsidiaries also may
not engage in activities that are "complementary" to financial activities. 12 U.S.C.
§ 24a(a)(2)(A). After November 12, 2004, the Federal Reserve and Treasury
Department may, through joint rulemaldng, authorize banking for financial
subsidiaries.
83. See 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(C). For purposes of making its capital calculations,
the national bank must deduct its investment, including retained earnings, in its
financial subsidiary. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(c); 12 C.F.R. § 5-19(h(l1 )(i).
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companies-can flow from the failure to maintain the necessary
capital, management, and CRA standards.'
National banks wishing to form financial subsidiaries are
subject to certain additional limitations not applicable to financial
holding companies. To begin with, financial subsidiaries are
subject to a size limitation: the total assets of all of the financial
subsidiaries of a national bank may not exceed forty-five percent
of the assets of the bank or fifty billion dollars, whichever sum is
larger." In addition, if the national bank is one of the 100 largest
in the country, it must issue debt that is rated in one of the top
three investment grade categories.86
B. Functional Regulation of Securities Activities
In addition to permitting new securities and bank
affiliations, GLBA essentially eliminated the blanket exemption
that banks had long enjoyed from the broker-dealer registration
requirements of the Exchange Act87 (and the investment adviser
registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940).88 Under these exemptions, banks (but generally not bank
affiliates) had been able to engage in securities brokerage,
investment advisory and other securities activities without
registering with the SEC and without complying with the various
rules to which securities firms doing analogous activities were
required to comply.89
Under GLBA, banks' blanket securities exclusion was
eliminated, and banks engaged in securities activities are required
to register with the SEC and comply with the agencies' rules
applying to securities firms. The broad exemption was eliminated
84. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(e), (f); 12 C.F.R. § 5.39(g).
85. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(D); 12 C.F.R. § 5.39(g)(2).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 5.39(g)(3).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B), (5) (2000).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000).
89. Broker-dealer registration plays a significant role in securities regulation and
requires that persons associated with a broker-dealer must pass a qualification exam
requiring substantive knowledge of the securities business. In addition to this
requirement, there are continuing education requirements and additional
examinations on supervisory procedures for those in management. SEC and
self-regulatory organization rules are also directed at sales practice abuses-those
that have committed abuses may be barred from working in the industry or subject to
conditions on their employment, such as enhanced supervision.
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because GLBA generally incorporated the principle of functional
regulation-one set of rules should govern the same financial
activity regardless of the entity conducting the activity. Because of
the net capital requirements and other rules that apply to broker-
dealers, banks generally cannot themselves register with the SEC.
Accordingly, the result of GLBA's provisions is to require banks
to "push out" most of their securities brokerage, dealing, and
investment advisory activities to affiliated broker-dealers and
investment advisers that are appropriately registered under the
securities laws."
Notwithstanding this general statutory requirement to
push-out securities activities, banks were permitted to continue to
engage in certain activities that were specifically identified in
GLBA as continuing to be permissible for them to conduct
directly without having to register with the SEC as a broker-
dealer. These "excepted" activities are designed to permit banks
to continue to provide those securities services that they have
traditionally offered.9' Excepted activities include, among others:
effecting securities transactions in connection with providing
traditional banking trust or fiduciary services; securities
safekeeping and custody activities; and third-party brokerage or
"networking" arrangements, in which a bank enters into a contract
with a broker-dealer to provide securities services to the bank's
92customers.
The precise scope of these "excepted" activities became a
major point of contention between the banking regulators and
banking industry, on the one hand, and the SEC, on the other.
The former interpreted the exceptions broadly to encompass a full
range of activities that they regarded as attendant to their
traditional banking businesses. The SEC, however, read the
exceptions more narrowly.93
90. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, Title IL.
91. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434, at 163-64 (1999); S. REP. No. 10&-44. at 10
(1999).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B) (2000).
93. Compare 66 Fed. Reg. 27,760 (May 18, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. pts.
200, 240) (initial SEC proposal interpreting GLBA's push out exemptions), wvith
Letter from the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
of the SEC, (June 29, 2001) (laying out the banking agencies' strong objection to the
SEC's position), available at http:l/vw.federalreserve.govfboarddo-prcssfgenerall
2001/20010702attachment.pd) (last .isited Feb. 19. 2002). See also Alan E. Sorcher,
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLBA: Two STEPS BACK?
The question remains open, two-and-a-half years since the
enactment of GLBA, as to what the law's ultimate impact will be.
At this stage, it is apparent that GLBA has not resulted in the
dramatic cross-industry merger activity that many had expected.
Even senior members of the Federal Reserve, including then-
Governor Laurence H. Meyer, have had to admit some degree of
surprise about the lack of sizeable cross-industry combinations
stemming from the GLBA.94 To date, only two securities firms
have acquired banks.95
The paucity of large cross-industry transactions of the sort
envisioned in 1999, when GLBA was enacted, of course, raises the
obvious question as to why those original expectations have not
Critics of Securities Activities Rule Should Consider the Consumer Upside, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 24, 2001, at 6.
94. See Laurence H. Meyer, Implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: One
Year Later, Speech before the American Law Institute and American Bar
Association (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches (last visited Feb. 19, 2002); see also Anthony M. Santomero, The Causes
and Effects of Financial Modernization, Speech before the Annual Meeting of the
New Jersey Bankers Association (Mar. 17, 2001), available at http://wwwphil.frb.org/
publicaffairs/speeches (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). Although over 500 organizations
have elected financial holding company status, the overwhelming majority of these
entities were formerly U.S. bank holding companies. Moreover, many of these
organizations are smaller, regional banking organizations that appear to have elected
financial holding company status not to make landmark securities acquisitions but,
instead, to engage in insurance agency activities without the encumbrances of the
pre-GLBA framework; to be able to make relatively small-scale non-banking equity
investments without the restrictions placed on such investments by section 4(c)(6) of
the BHCA and similar pre-GLBA statutory provisions; or simply to avoid the
rigorous and time-consuming notice, application and other requirements applicable
to bank holding companies seeking to engage in new activities under the BHCA. See
Kini, supra note 65.
95. The first acquisition was Charles Schwab's purchase of U.S. Trust
Corporation. See The Charles Schwab Corp., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 233 (2001) (order
approving acquisition and merger of Bank Holding Companies). More recently
Friedman, Billings & Ramsey bought a small depository institution. See Friedman,
Billings, and Ramsey Group, Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 346 (2001) (order approving
formation of BHCs and Determination on FHC Elections). A few other
cross-industry deals have been consummated. For instance, two large Swiss banking
organizations (Credit Suisse Group and UBS AG) also acquired large securities
companies (Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and PaineWebber, respectively). But it is
likely that these transactions could have been restructured and consummated under
the old Glass-Steagall Act and the BHCA, as it existed prior to its amendment by
GLBA.
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been met. We submit that at least one explanation-albeit not the
exclusive reason-is that the regulatory implementation of GLBA
has dampened some of the early enthusiasm among securities
firms to become affiliated with banks."
Of primary importance in this regard are the merchant
banking rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve in conjunction
with the Treasury Department and the other banking regulators.
The merchant banking rulemaking-which resulted in a
comprehensive series of restrictions on the merchant banking
activities of bank affiliates that stand-alone securities firms do not
face-sent a signal to the industry that the Federal Reserve
intended to regulate and supervise financial holding company
activities in the same relatively conservative manner that it had
employed in the regulation of bank holding companies under the
BHCA.
96. This is not, admittedly, the only plausible explanation. Others also deserve
consideration. To begin vdth, it is quite possible that the initial expectations for
GLBA were too great. As noted in Part II, GLBA in many respects merely codified
and formalized reasonably well-established regulatory interpretations and positions
that applied to bank holding companies. See supra notes 61-9 3 and accompanying
text.
And, as described in Part I.B, the Glass-Steagall Act, at least in its dying days,
really did not present such a significant barrier to the affiliation of banks
vith securities firms, although the bank generally had to be the purchaser. See supra
notes 25-46 and accompanying text. By the time GLBA passed, many po.sible
combinations had already occurred. The regulatory barriers to other types of
combinations, such as banking and insurance mergers, were more imposing. Here,
GLBA did represent a more significant departure from the past. Yet, even in this
context, there were ways for insurance and other non-banking firms to acquire
depository institutions. For example, many insurance companies and a broad range
of other non-banking organizations availed themselves of the unitary thrift option,
which allowed such companies to own a single depository institution (a saings
association) while engaging in any type of financial or non-financial activities. See,
e.g., Ira L. Tannenbaum, The Unitary Thrift Holding Company and the Thrift Charter
after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, BANKING L. & POL REP. (De. 20, 1999).
Thus, when GLBA was finally enacted, after more than tv,.o decades of
gestation, there was little "pent up" demand on the part of banking, securities and
insurance firms to affiliate vith each other. Instead, those firms that v, anted to offer
their customers the full panoply of securities, banking and insurance products had-
through various legal mechanisms and structures-found v,.as to do so. This, of
course, remains the case today. For example, a few securities firms, vithout
becoming a FHC, currently own "non-bank" depository institutions and are able to
offer FDIC-insured money market accounts through these institutions to their
brokerage clients.
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The merchant banking rules and other rules implementing
GLBA likely led at least some securities firms to decide to take a
"wait-and-see" attitude before electing financial holding company
status.97 These rules also made clear that the distinction between
bank broker-dealers and securities firms not affiliated with banks
was not dead.
A. Merchant Banking Limitations
Merchant banking is an important part of the business of
many securities firms, and the most serious limitations on broker-
dealers that are part of financial holding companies result from the
rules issued by the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department on
merchant banking activities.
As noted above,98 GLBA permits financial holding
companies to make merchant banking or venture capital
investments. The Act imposes a specific set of limits and
restrictions on such investment activities. Namely, GLBA requires
that: (1) investments cannot be held by a depository institution;
(2) investments generally must be held by a securities affiliate or
an affiliate thereof; (3) investments must be made as part of a bona
fide merchant banking activity; (4) investments may only be
retained for such period of time that will permit their disposition
on a reasonable basis; (5) financial holding companies may not
engage in routine management of a merchant banking portfolio
company, except as necessary to protect their investment in that
company; (6) there should be limits on cross-marketing between
merchant banking portfolio companies and depository institutions
controlled by the same FHC; (7) there should be special affiliate
transactions restrictions between depository institutions and
commonly controlled merchant banking portfolio firms; and (8)
financial subsidiaries of national banks should not be permitted to
engage in merchant banking for at least five years from the
enactment of GLBA and, thereafter, should only be allowed to do
so if the Federal Reserve and Treasury jointly agree to authorize
it.99 GLBA also grants the Federal Reserve and Treasury
97. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schmitt, Greenspan vs. the Banks: Is a Renatch in the
Making?, Bus. WK., May 21, 2001, at 53.
98. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
99. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2000); 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(11) (2000).
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authority to issue such "implementing" regulations as they feel
necessary to assure compliance with the purposes of and prevent
evasions of the Act.100
Industry representatives hoped that financial holding
companies' merchant banking activities would be governed
exclusively (or at least principally) by GLBA's limitations; instead,
on March 17,2000, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department
issued rules governing merchant banking activities."0' First, the
agencies issued an interim rule that included detailed provisions on
recordkeeping, reporting and risk management practices for
merchant banking investments; holding periods for such
investments; corporate separateness and limits on involvement in
management; and an absolute dollar cap on the total merchant
banking investments that can be made by a financial holding
company. At the same time, the Federal Reserve issued a
proposed rule that would have imposed a fifty percent capital
requirement on merchant banking investments and certain similar
investments made under pre-existing BHCA authority."2- The
proposed fifty percent capital charge was a significant additional
burden-the charge was materially greater than the eight percent
capital level required for almost all other financial holding
company activities.0 3
Industry reaction to the twin rules-and, in particular, the
capital rule-was swift and furious."' Industry commentators,
joined by several members of Congress, contended that these rules
were not envisioned by Congress when it enacted GLBA and
100. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(7)(A).
101. 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480 (Mar. 28,2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
102- See id. Under the proposal, a financial holding company v, ould generally
have been required to deduct fifty percent of the total carrying value of all merchant
banldng investments from the company's required regulatory Tier 1 capital. In
addition, the proposal would have applied the same capital treatment to investments
in non-financial companies held under section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA, wvhich allowved
bank holding companies to own five percent of the voting shares of any company.
See ii.
103. For a description of bank holding company capital requirements, see
MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARIETs ACTIVITIES OF B x'-s
AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 318-27 (1993).
104. See Satish M. Kini, Banking Agencies Propose Revised Capital Rules
Governing Merchant Banking in Non-financial Companies, 118 BANI-aNG L. J. 334,
336 (2001); Rob Garver, Further Easing Sought in Merchant Banking Regs, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 3,2001, at 1.
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would have a significantly adverse affect on the ability of financial
holding companies to make merchant banking and other
permissible investments on the same scale and to the same extent
as securities firms that are not affiliated with a bank. In addition,
industry commentators contended that, because merchant banking
is such an important part of the business of many securities firms,
the existence of these restrictions would discourage securities firms
from becoming financial holding companies and hamper and limit
affiliations between banking and securities companies. In short,
according to the industry, the merchant banking rules would
recreate the segmentation of and the "unlevel playing field" in the
financial services industry that is at the very core of what Congress
sought to abolish with the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act and the
enactment of the GLBA.10 5
In the face of such vociferous objection, the Federal
Reserve and Treasury Department retreated to some extent from
their original set of merchant banking rules. In January 2001, the
Federal Reserve and Treasury Department issued a final merchant
banking rule that, from the industry's vantage point, was a bit less
objectionable.1 16 For example, the final rule essentially eliminated
the interim rule's caps or limits on total merchant banking
investments. Under the interim rule, a financial holding
company's total merchant banking investments (including interests
in private equity funds) could not exceed the lesser of six billion
dollars or thirty percent of its Tier 1 capital. In addition, the
interim rule prohibited a financial holding company's merchant
banking investments (excluding interests in private equity funds)
from exceeding the lesser of four billion dollars or twenty percent
of its Tier 1 capital. The final rule also eliminated entirely the six
billion and four billion dollar-based limits on total merchant
banking investments. The final rule further sunset the two
remaining Tier 1 limits so that they would be eliminated once the
Federal Reserve adopted a final capital rule for merchant banking
105. See, e.g., Rob Blackwell, Industry Rips Interim Rules Limiting Merchant
Banking, AM. BANKER, June 14,2001, at 4.
106. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466
(Jan. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 225 and 1500).
[Vol. 6
BANK BROKER-DEALERS
investments 07 (which the Federal Reserve did in January 2002).113
Despite these and other changes made to the rule in
response to industry comments, the merchant banldng rule
continues to present a fairly complex and burdensome array of
restrictions and limitations on merchant banking activities that do
not apply to the venture capital activities of stand-alone securities
firms.
10 9
The complexity of the rule is most evident in its treatment
of "private equity funds." The final rule imposes greater
restrictions on merchant banldng investments made directly by
financial holding companies and comparatively fewer restrictions
and limits on portfolio investments made by financial holding
companies through private fund vehicles."0 But the definition of
private equity funds is a complex five-part standard. The rule then
imposes different sets of operational, recordkeeping and reporting
restrictions on funds that meet that definition than on those that
do not."' In addition, the final rule places different sets of limits
on funds-both those that qualify for private equity fund status
and those that do not-that are "controlled" by financial holding
companies from those funds that are not. Thus, a single
financial holding company may face four different sets of
restrictions that apply to its fund investments: one for private
equity funds that are controlled by a FHC; a second for private
equity funds that are not controlled by a FHC; a third for funds
that do not qualify for private equity fund status and that are
controlled by a FHC; and a fourth for funds that do not meet the
107. I& at 8,467.
108. 67 Fed. Reg. 3784 (Jan. 25 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3. 203. 225,
and 325).
109. See Rob Garver, Reaction to Capital Rule: A Better Brand of Onerous, AM,1.
BAmER, Dec. 11, 2001, at 1; Alan E. Sorcher & James D. SpAllman, Fcderai
Regulators Should Return to Gramnmn-Leach-Bliley's Intent, AM. BXM.-ER, May 7,
2001, at 31.
110. Private equity funds pool a financial holding company's investments vith
those of third parties. Investments made through private equity funds generally
require less regulatory scrutiny because of the market discipline offered by the third
party fund investors. See, e.g., Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
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private equity fund definition and that are not controlled by a
FHC."1
3
The rule's limits and restrictions are evident from many
provisions. For instance, the rule imposes a restriction on the
ability of financial holding companies to hold investments beyond
ten years (or fifteen years for private equity fund investments)." 4
The rule also places restrictions on the types of covenants and
agreements that financial holding companies may enter into with
portfolio companies.115 In addition, the final rule contains a
variety of restrictions on the types of financial holding company
employees and officers that may be involved in the activities of a
portfolio company. The result is that financial holding companies
face compliance burdens under the Federal Reserve and Treasury
Department's merchant banking rule that securities firms not
affiliated with banks do not face.'
16
As with the final merchant banking rule, the final capital
rule represents a measured improvement over the Federal
Reserve's original proposal of March 2000. The rule requires firms
to take a deduction ranging between eight and twenty-five percent
from their Tier 1 capital depending on the level of their equity
investments." 7
Arguably, the Federal Reserve could have taken a different
tack-one that would have been less burdensome. It could have
113. Id.
114. These pre-set holding periods arguably are at odds with the flexibility
provided by GLBA's provision that merchant banking investments be permitted to
be held for such period of time to "enable the sale or disposition thereof on a
reasonable basis consistent with the financial viability" of the investment. 12 U.S.C. §
1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (2000). By imposing a time frame on holding investments, the rule
may cause financial holding companies to sell certain investments prematurely, rather
than when financially optimal.
115. These covenants enable firms to protect their merchant banking investments.
116. Additional burdens may result from yet undefined reporting requirements.
In promulgating their final rule, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have reaffirmed
that financial holding companies will be required to submit quarterly reports on their
merchant banking portfolios and annual information with details on particular
merchant banking investments, including anticipated exit strategies. Detailed
reporting requirements will impose needless costs on merchant banking activities, are
unnecessary given the other forms of regulatory supervision to which financial
holding companies are subject and flatly contradicts GLBA's dictate to the Board to
reduce the regulatory burden that it inflicts on financial holding companies.




allowed firms to rely on internal capital allocation models to
control the risks of non-financial investment activities. Such
models, which are used by securities firms to manage merchant
banking risks, allow each institution to measure and capture the
complexity of that firm's merchant banking investment program,
accounting for the risks and capital needs that are specific to the
nature and level of the firm's portfolio investment activities.
Internal models also offer the advantage that they can be fine-
tuned on a continuous basis to accommodate developments and
changes in economic, investment and portfolio conditions in a
manner that the Federal Reserve's rules cannot."1
Securities firms that are not part of a financial holding
company do not face the types of regulatory restrictions and
capital requirements that are set forth in the twin merchant
banking rules. Accordingly, bank affiliates that engage in
merchant banking activities face restrictions that their brethren
investment banks do not. 9
B. Restricting the Abiliy to Diversifty
Another area where differences exist for securities firms
and entities that are part of financial holding companies is in their
ability to engage in so-called "expanded" financial activities.
Broker-dealers and other companies that are part of financial
holding companies are limited to activities that are deemed
"financial in nature," "incidental thereto," or complementary to a
financial activity.20 Under GLBA, they are not allowed to engage
118. In addition, reliance on an internal modelsupervisory framework serves to
encourage institutions to improve continuously risk management systems and
capabilities so as to produce more sophisticated, reliable and accurate capital
measurements. By contrast, the approach taken by the Federal Reserve-by
applying the same capital charge to all institutions that make the same level of
merchant banking and non-financial equity investments as a percentage of their Tier
1 capital-penalizes institutions regardless of how carefully they monitor and manage
their portfolio investment activities.
119. The regulatory agencies' approach was posited on the belief that merchant
banking activity poses substantially greater risks than other permissible activities for
financial holding companies. That belief, however, appears to run counter to the
well-established track record of securities firms in making and managing their
merchant banking investments---even during the recent large declines in the U.S.
equity and venture capital markets.
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000).
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in activities outside of these three boxes and to conduct
"commercial" businesses.' Securities firms that are not affiliated
with banks face no such restrictions.
The significance to a financial institution of being able to
diversify its activities, without restriction, should not be
overlooked. After all, that legal flexibility affords the institution
the opportunity to react quickly to business opportunities and
market changes. GLBA was viewed as creating an opportunity for
bank-affiliated firms to take advantage of such market
developments. For this reason, the Act permitted financial
holding companies (and financial subsidiaries, albeit to a
somewhat lesser extent) to engage in a broad spectrum of financial
activities.122 The Act also eliminated many of the prior approval
and application requirements that existed in the pre-existing bank
regulatory framework.1 23
GLBA included a laundry list of activities deemed
permissible for banking affiliates and further contemplated that
this list would be expanded through regulatory action to keep pace
with changes in the marketplace and technology.24 Indeed, the
Act vested the Federal Reserve and Treasury with broad authority
to add new activities to the list. 25
121. There is an exception for certain "grandfathered" commercial activities. See
12 U.S.C. § 1843(n).
122. An expansive list of activities is permissible under GLBA that are defined to
be "financial in nature" or "incidental" to a financial activity. Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act § 103(a).
123. Companies that qualify as financial holding companies may engage in,
generally, any of the activities on the approved list without the Federal Reserve's
prior approval; however, a financial holding company must notify the appropriate
Federal Reserve Bank in writing within thirty days after commencing a new activity
on the list or acquiring shares of company engaged in such activity. 12 U.S.C. §
1843(k)(6); 12 C.F.R. § 225.87.
124. See Meyer, supra note 94 (noting that GLBA "creatively and pragmatically
permits the Federal Reserve ... to respond to evolving market trends and technology
without requiring the drawn out and always lagging process of amending statutes in
response to market developments").
125. The Federal Reserve, in consultation with the Treasury, is authorized by
GLBA to determine that an activity is "financial in nature" or "incidental to a
financial activity." The Federal Reserve may also add to the list of permissible
activities by finding that an activity is complementary to a financial activity and does
not pose certain other risks. Financial Holding Companies, 12 C.F.R §§ 225.88,
225.89 (Jan. 18, 2002). In that connection, the Federal Reserve's rules establish a
procedure to request that the Federal Reserve determine that a particular activity is
complementary to a financial activity, and to receive approval to engage in that
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There have been several rules and proposed rules regarding
new activities, such as "finder" activities, data processing
functions, and real estate brokerage and management services.
But, to date, it appears that the agencies are taking a rather
cautious approach to permitting firms to broaden their reach.
1. Finder Activities
Acting as a "finder" is defined as bringing together buyers
and sellers of products or services for transactions that the parties
themselves negotiate.16 For example, a financial institution may
host an Internet marketplace by including links to the websites of
buyers and sellers on its own website. In addition, a financial
institution, under the finder activity, could allow buyers and sellers
to post information on its website concerning products and
services and to enter into transactions among themselves.'2
The Federal Reserve has approved acting as a "finder" as a
permissible activity for a financial holding company, but it has not
adopted a very expansive approach in defining the permitted range
of activities. 2S In issuing its finder rule, the Federal Reserve found
that acting as a finder is an activity that is "incidental" to a
financial activity, and is therefore a permissible activity pursuant
to the GLBA. 29
The main shortcomings of the activity begin with the
Federal Reserve's classification of the activity as being
"incidental" to financial activity, as opposed to being "financial in
nature." That classification is more than semantic, because it
limits the ability to have other related activities added on to the
main activity. To explain, an activity defined as "financial" can
later be broadened through the authorization of further activities
activity.
126. Financial Holding Companies, 12 C.F.R § 225.86 (d)( 1 )(ii) (Jan. 18, 2002).
127. Id
128. 12 C.F.R § 225.S6(d)(1). National banks and their subsidiaries already vere
permitted to engage in finder activities prior to the GLBA's enactment. See 12
C.F.R. § 7.1002; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 875 (Oct. 31, 1999) [1999-2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banldng L. Rep. (CCH) S 81,69; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 856
(Mar. 5, 1999) [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banling L. Rep. (CCH) 81, 313.
129. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,735-02 (Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 12 CF.R. pt.
203).
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that are incidental to it. On the other hand, an activity defined as
"incidental" cannot be broadened in that same fashion.
The rule also limits the authority of a finder to act only as
an intermediary. For instance, the rule prevents a finder from
negotiating for or binding third parties, and prevents a finder from
becoming a principal in the underlying transaction. 3 ' Financial
holding companies are also prohibited from providing distribution
services for products offered or sold through their finder
services. 3
Many financial holding companies will benefit from the
new rule because it does broaden the range of services that they
can provide. The finder activity particularly holds much promise,
as the Internet becomes a medium of choice for various types of
financial and business activities. The restrictions and limitations
imposed by the Federal Reserve, however, may harness some of
the real value of the finder services. Moreover, these restrictions
and limitations do not exist in the case of securities firms that are
not affiliated with banks.
2. Data Processing
The Federal Reserve also issued proposals expanding data
processing activities, and permitting certain data storage and
Internet hosting activities. 32 Once again, however, the Federal
Reserve placed restrictions on these activities.
Prior to the enactment of GLBA, the Federal Reserve
permitted bank holding companies to engage in unlimited financial
data processing activities, and in a limited amount of non-financial
data processing.'33 Specifically, the Federal Reserve restricted the
total revenues earned from non-financial data processing to thirty
percent of the total annual revenues earned from data processing
and data transmission.'34
After the enactment of GLBA, the Federal Reserve
proposed to permit all bank holding companies (not exclusively
130. Financial Holding Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (d)(1)(iii)(B)(1) (Jan. 18,
2002).
131. Id
132. 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).




financial holding companies) to conduct a greater amount of
nonfinancial data processing." 5 Specifically, the Federal Reserve
proposed to increase the limit on non-financial data processing
from thirty to forty-nine percent. The Federal Reserve also
proposed to allow financial holding companies-as an activity that
is complementary to financial activities-to own companies
engaged in certain types of data storage, general data processing,
Internet and portal hosting activities, and advisory activities
involving data processing."b Under the proposal, investment in
these activities is limited to an aggregate investment cap of five
percent of a financial holding company's Tier 1 capital."' In
addition, investments in general data processing companies may be
made without reference to the type of data processed or
transmitted by the companies-so long as at least twenty percent
of the companies' revenues are derived from (a) providing data
processing services to depository. institutions and their affiliates;
(b) processing financial data; and/or (c) sale of other financial
products and services."
As with the finder rule, the Federal Reserve's proposal to
authorize new data processing activities was welcome but a bit
narrower in scope than many had hoped. Arguably, the Federal
Reserve has the authority under the GLBA to permit financial
holding companies to engage in broader nonfinancial data
processing. Processing financial data could easily be viewed as an
activity that is financial in nature, and processing nonfinancial data
could be determined to be an activity that is incidental to a
financial activity. Because financial holding company activities
need not be limited by the "closely related to banking" standard
found in section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA'- but, instead, can be
135. 65 Fed. Reg. S0,3S4, SO-385 (Dec. 21, 20U0) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
225).
136. The proposal also sought comment on whether financial holding companies
should be permitted to make investments in companies engaged in developing new
technologies related to the sale of financial products and services. companies that
provide communication links for the delivery of financial products, and companies
that engage in the electronic sale and delivery of products and services. Although it
is not clear whether the Federal Reserve will act on this part of the proposal, these
kinds of investments are essential if financial holding companies are to compete with
other sectors venturing into financial services. It. at 80,386.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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authorized by the broader "financial in nature" or "incidental"
standards, GLBA could be read to authorize financial holding
companies to conduct nonfinancial data processing beyond the
forty-nine percent threshold.
1 40
The forty-nine percent revenue limit put financial holding
companies at a competitive disadvantage to other firms engaged in
data processing activities by creating an artificial limit on the
financial holding companies' activities. This limit could result in
pricing distortions and inefficiencies that do not exist for providers
not subject to these restrictions. Moreover, as the lines between
financial and nonfinancial data become harder to maintain (and
the distinction is already rather ephemeral), this forty-nine percent
revenue limit will become more difficult and costly to monitor.
The Federal Reserve's proposal to allow financial holding
companies, as complementary activities, to own or invest in
companies engaged in certain types of data storage, general data
processing and data transmission services, electronic information
portal services, and advisory activities involving data processing
also fails to extend as broadly as many desired. The proposal falls
short because conducting data storage and related activities should
be considered to be a financial in nature activity and not a
complementary activity. Again, this distinction is significant
because the Federal Reserve may impose conditions on the
conduct of complementary activities that it could not impose on
financial in nature activities.1 41 Moreover, data storage could well
be considered to be financial in nature because acting as a
custodian of files is almost identical in kind to the "safekeeping
and custody" services that banks have traditionally provided.
The requirement that investments in the three categories of
activities be limited to five percent of the financial holding
company's Tier 1 capital is also problematic. While the Federal
Reserve's intent with this seems to be to limit the potential risk to
the safety and soundness of a financial holding company, this five
140. The Federal Reserve has acknowledged that the "financial in nature"
standard is broader than the "closely related to banking" standard. See, e.g., 65 Fed.
Reg. at 80,385 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
141. The Federal Reserve may only authorize complementary activities that do
not "pose a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of depository institutions or
the financial system generally." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000).
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percent cap appears to be arbitrary. 4"2 In addition, the restrictions
on general data processing and data transmission services go too
far and will prevent financial holding companies from engaging in
a full range of data processing activities.
As the Internet and electronic commerce become
increasingly important parts of the financial marketplace and
economy, financial holding companies should have the ability to
engage in a full range of e-commerce and data processing
activities. Their inability to do so places financial holding
companies and their securities affiliates at a competitive
disadvantage to firms that are not affiliated with banks. Such
disadvantages distinguish stand-alone securities firms from bank-
affiliated ones.
3. Real Estate Brokerage and Management
In other areas as well, bank affiliates are restricted in their
activities. For instance, as of the date of this writing, they are not
permitted to engage in real estate brokerage and real estate
management activities. No such restrictions exist for other broker-
dealers and their affiliates, although most (by choice) do not
engage in such activities.
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury have proposed to
allow financial holding companies and financial subsidiaries to
engage in real estate brokerage and management activities. 43 This
proposal has, however, engendered significant opposition from
real estate brokers.14
If this proposal is carried forward, another restriction on
bank affiliates will fall away. If it is stopped because of the real
142. Moreover, it is not clear whether the five percent cap would apply to all
activities that are heretofore defined as complementary, or vill just apply to three
categories of activities enumerated in the present proposal. The ability of financial
holding companies to take advantage of the complementary activities would certainly
be limited if all complementary activities-those in this rule and all future authorized
activities-are limited to five percent of an institution's Tier 1 capital.
143. 66 Fed. Reg. 307 (proposed Jan. 3,2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 225
and 1501).
144. See, e.g., Dean Anason, DC Speaks: Realtor Group Fighting to Keep Banks
QffIts Turf, AM. BANKER, June 8, 2001, at 4.
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estate brokers' opposition, it will demonstrate the limits of
GLBA. 1
45
C. Referral Fees Under Third-Party Brokerage Arrangements
A final set of restrictions exists in the way that banks
interact with broker-dealers under so-called third-party brokerage
(or networking) arrangements. Under such arrangements, broker-
dealers offer brokerage services to bank customers, frequently by
operating on bank premises. 146 Networking arrangements are of
particular importance to many bank broker-dealers, which rely on
such arrangements for their business.
Networking arrangements existed prior to GLBA. Up
until GLBA, these arrangements had been conducted pursuant to
SEC no-action positions,'47 the rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers,'48 and guidance issued by the federal bank
regulatory agencies. 49 These rules allowed bank personnel (who
are not registered and licensed under the federal securities laws) to
earn nominal referral fees for referrals to the registered
representatives of broker-dealers. These fees-which could not be
made contingent to the success of the referral-are a key part of
the networking arrangements.
Under the interim rules issued by the SEC to implement
GLBA's push-out provisions, 5 ' it appears that-banks and broker-
dealers that enter into networking arrangements will now be
subject to additional restrictions on the referral fees that they may
145. 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (d)(1) (iii) specifically excludes this activity since a finder
needs a real estate agent's or broker's license.
146. 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(4)(B)(i) (2000).
147. Chubb Securities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 76,829, at 78,387 (Nov. 24, 1993), available at 1993 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1204 (Nov. 24, 1993).
148. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, NASD MANUAL: RULES
0100-3420, 120-122 (giving the full text of Rule 2350), available at http://www.barreau.
qc.ca/congres/2001/pdf/19-garcia-manual.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,2002).
149. Uniform Guidance on Mutual Fund Sales, Interagency Guidelines, 7 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 70-101, at 82,551-58 (Feb. 15, 1994); Clarification of
Interagency Guidelines, 7 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 70-111, at 82,575-78 (Sept.
12, 1995). These guidelines were jointly issued by the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
150. See supra note 91and accompanying text.
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pay."' In the interim rules, the SEC limited the referral fees that
could be paid to only: (1) "[a] payment that does not exceed one
hour of the gross cash wages of the unregistered bank employee
making a referral;" or (2) "[p]oints in a system or program that
covers a range of bank products and non-securities related services
where the points count toward a bonus that is cash or non-cash if
the points (and their value) awarded for referrals involving
securities are not greater than the points (and their value) awarded
for activities not involving securities." "2
The interim rules' limitations on referral fees, whether in
the form of monetary payments or in the form of award points,
create additional burdens and are detrimental to the overall
securities referral programs between broker-dealers and their
affiliated or networked banks.
IV. CONCLUSION
The landscape of financial services today looks far different
than during the early part of the twentieth century. This is due to
many factors, including the consolidation that occurred in the mid
1990s, the rapid advance of technology, the globalization of our
economy and GLBA.
In this new world, securities firms that have not partnered
with a bank-the "unaffiliated broker-dealers"-face some
difficult strategic questions. For instance, can these firms go it
alone without having the ability to provide credit facilities to
customers to the same extent as banks? In an increasingly global
economy, can firms operate profitably without the efficiencies and
resources of a worldwide organization?
As firms struggle with these issues, one factor they wil
weigh in considering whether to become affiliated with a bank is
the extra level of regulation of bank-affiliated firms. Although the
level of regulation is not likely to be the sole determinative factor
151. Interim Rule § 240.3b-17(g), at 66 Fed. Reg, 27,799 (May 18, 201t1).
152. Id The rules also provide that securities referral fees - whether points or
cash-may not be related to: (1) size or value of any securities trans3ction;
(2) amount of securities-related assets gathered, (3) size or value of a customer's
bank or securities account; or (4) financial status of a customer. GLBA's safeguard-
the prohibition of the payment of a referral fee that is contingent on vhether the
referral results in a transaction-is sufficient to protect investors. Id.
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in the outcome of these decisions, the restrictions that are part and
parcel of bank affiliation must be carefully evaluated.
Indeed, despite GLBA, broker-dealers that are part of
banking firms still face restrictions that their brethren do not; thus,
at least for now, it is safe to say that the term "bank broker-
dealer" still has meaning.
